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Abstract An important problem in Model Driven Engineering is main-
taining the correctness of a specification under model transformations.
We consider this issue for a framework that implements the transforma-
tion chain from the modeling language SLCO to Java. In particular, we
verify the generic part of the last transformation step to Java code, in-
volving change in granularity, focusing on the implementation of SLCO
communication channels. To this end we use a parameterized modular
approach; we apply a novel proof schema that supports fine grained con-
currency and procedure-modularity, and use the separation logic based
tool VeriFast. Our results show that such tool-assisted formal verifica-
tion can be a viable addition to traditional techniques, supporting object
orientation, concurrency via threads, and parameterized verification.
1 Introduction
Model-Driven Software Engineering (MDSE) [18] is a methodology that recently
gained popularity as a method for efficient software development. Constructing
a model enables the developer to deal with difficult aspects at a higher and less
complex level of abstraction. Transformations are used to create new models,
source code, test scripts and other artifacts. By shifting the focus from the
code to the model, MDSE allows to tackle defects in the software already in the
modeling phase. Resolving errors in the early stages of the software development
process reduces the costs and increases the reliability of the end product.
An important question is whether transformations are correct. Various types
of correctness are relevant for model transformations, such as type correctness
and correspondence correctness [22]. In earlier work, we have addressed how
to determine that model-to-model transformations preserve functional proper-
ties [29,28,30]. In this paper, we focus on checking that model-to-code transfor-
mations preserve the behavioural semantics of the model [22]: If we have proven
that certain functional properties hold in a model, such as the absence of data
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races or deadlocks, how can we ensure that those properties still hold in the
generated source code?
Specifically, we focus on models of systems consisting of concurrent, inter-
acting components, and wish to transform those models into multi-threaded
software. For compositional models, an Object Oriented (OO) implementation
language seems a natural choice, since it allows us to map components to objects.
We have chosen Java. The modelling language we use is called SLCO (Simple
Language of Communicating Objects) [1]. SLCO models consist of components
that communicate through channels. Each component is described in terms of a
finite number of concurrently operating state machines that can share variables.
After a chain of transformations of SLCO models, in which incrementally more
concrete information about the specified system can be added, multi-threaded
Java code should be generated based on the last SLCO model, in which each
SLCO state machine is mapped to its own thread.
SLCO has a coarse granularity that supports thinking about concurrency at
a convenient high level of abstraction. On the other hand, the generated code
implements concurrency through multi-threading, with a level of granularity
that is much more fine-grained. This approach facilitates the development of
correct, well-performing, complex software. However, the code generation step
is challenging to implement, since the transition from coarse to fine-grained
concurrency needs to be done in a way that correct and well-performing software
can be generated.
Our approach to setting up the model-to-code transformation step is to iden-
tify the concepts in SLCO that are model independent on the one hand, and
model dependent on the other. The model independent concepts can be trans-
formed to Java once, and from that moment on referred to in all code generated
from specific SLCO models. An example of a model independent SLCO con-
cept is the communication channel, while state machines are model dependent
concepts, since their structure differs from one model to another.
For the specification of the behaviour of Java objects, we opt for using sepa-
ration logic [23], since it allows us to specify behaviour in a way independent of
the implementation language. We require concurrency, so we actually work with
the version of separation logic with fractional permissions. Full verification of
semantics preservation of model-to-code transformations then involves establish-
ing that these specifications correspond with the semantics of the corresponding
SLCO constructs. For this to be possible, we require a modular approach, in
which the specification of constructs can be used for the verification of code in
which those constructs play a role.
As a first step, in this paper, we focus on how to formally specify the be-
haviour of model independent concepts, such that modular verification of code
using those concepts is possible. In fact, using such specifications allows the
verification of code without relying on the actual implementation of the model
independent concepts, thereby truly realising a modular way of working. Our
aim is to show that modular verification of model-to-code transformations of
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multi-component systems is necessary and feasible, and we demonstrate how
this can be concretely done.
The model independent concepts are implemented in what we refer to as
generic code. To verify this code, a theorem proving approach is called for, be-
cause the generic code contains parameters that only get concrete values when
used in specific code derived from particular input models. Furthermore, since
the generic code has fine-grained concurrency, we require procedure-modularity,
and we use the approach from [16] that supports this. Tool-wise, we require
a verification tool that supports OO code, concurrency and separation logic
with fractional permissions, leading to the choice of VeriFast [15]. A procedure-
modular approach can be achieved by using ghost code and abstract predicates.
Contributions. First of all, we introduce a new modular specification schema
to specify the behaviour of modelling constructs in a setting where 1) fine-grained
parallelism is used, and 2) the environment is general, i.e., we do not need to
know anything about the environment to specify the constructs. Compared to
earlier work, our schema allows a better abstraction from the implementation
details of the methods being specified.
We demonstrate our approach by specifying and verifying a representative
part of the generic code, namely the communication channel. This shows the
feasibility of the approach, but also that judicious choices of implementation
language, specification language, verification approach and tooling are required.
As mentioned in [22], proving correctness of a program is not as complex
as proving correctness of a transformation that produces programs. By making
a distinction between generic and specific code, the complexity of proving the
correctness of model-to-code transformations can be lowered. Generic code can
largely be treated as any other program, apart from the fact that it raises new
concerns regarding the larger program context in which code constructs can be
placed; these concerns are covered in this paper. As a result, the remaining proof
obligations for the transformation as a whole can be simplified; once we turn our
attention to the specific code, we can directly use the specifications of the generic
code constructs. With respect to related work (Section 6), this is a novel way to
address the correctness of model-to-code transformations.
Section 2 introduces SLCO and explains how SLCO models are transformed
to Java code. Section 3 explains the essentials of separation logic. In Section 4,
the new modular specification schema is described, and in Section 5 it is demon-
strated how to apply the schema to specify and verify a Java implementation
of the SLCO channel datatype using VeriFast. Section 6 discusses related work,
and Section 7 contains our conclusions and pointers to future work.
2 SLCO and Its Transformation to Java
In SLCO, systems consisting of concurrent, communicating components can be
described using an intuitive graphical syntax. The components are instances
of classes, and connected by asynchronous channels, over which they send and
receive signals. They are connected to the channels via their ports.
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SendRec
m == 6;
send S("a") to InOut;
receive T(s) from InOut
Rec2
receive Q(m | m >= 0) from In2;
m := m + 1
Rec1
receive P([[false]]) from In1
Com0
Com1
send P(true) to Out1
Com2
after 5 ms
send Q(5) to Out2;
receive S(s) from InOut;
send T(s) to InOut
Figure 1. Behaviour diagram of an SLCO model
The behaviour of a
component is specified
using a finite number of
state machines, such as
in Figure 1, where two
components are defined
(the two main rectan-
gles). The parallel exe-
cution of those machines
is formalised in the form
of interleaving seman-
tics. Variables either be-
long to the whole com-
ponent or an individual
state machine. The variables that belong to a component are accessible by all
state machines that are part of the component (for instance, variable m in the
left component of Figure 1). Each transition has a source and target state, and a
list of statements that are executed when the transition is fired. A transition can
be fired if it is enabled, and it is enabled if the first of the associated statements is
enabled. If a transition is fired but subsequent statements are blocked, the tran-
sition blocks until they become enabled. SLCO supports a variety of statement
types. For communication between components, there are statements for sending
and receiving signals over channels. The statement send T (s) to InOut , for in-
stance, sends a signal named T with a single argument s via port InOut . Its coun-
terpart receive T (s) from InOut receives a signal named T from port InOut
and stores the value of the argument in variable s. A send statement is enabled
if the buffer of the channel is not full, and a receive statement is enabled if there
is a message in the buffer.
Statements such as receive P ([[false]]) from In1 offer a form of conditional
signal reception. Only those signals whose argument is equal to false will be
accepted. Another example is the statement receive Q(m | m ≥ 0) from In2 ,
which only accepts those signals whose argument is greater than or equal to 0.
For the above statements to be enabled, there must be a message available in
the channel buffer satisfying the conditions.
Boolean expressions, such as m==6 , denote statements that are enabled iff
the expression holds. Time is incorporated by means of delay statements. For
example, the statement after 5 ms blocks until 5 ms have passed since the
moment the source state was entered. Assignment statements, such as m :=
m + 1 , are used to assign values to variables. They are always enabled.
Our approach to derive executable code from an SLCO model is as shown in
the activity diagram of Figure 2: generic code constructs are used for the basic
elements in SLCO, i.e., for channels (synchronous and asynchronous), states,
transitions, and a mechanism to move between states by performing transitions.
A model-to-code transformation takes an SLCO model as input and produces
model specific Java code that refers to the generic constructs as output. There
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implementations of 
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Combine
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Figure 2. Activity diagram of the transformation process from SLCO to Java
is a one-to-one mapping between SLCO state machines and Java threads. Fi-
nally, this specific code is combined with the generic code to obtain a complete,
executable implementation that should behave as the SLCO model specifies.
3 Separation Logic
Separation logic [20,23] builds upon Hoare logic [13] and in the context of con-
current programs also on the Owicki-Gries method [21].
We assume a Java-like OO programming language that supports aliasing and
references: allocation and deallocation of heap addresses (memory cells), as well
as assignments to and from a heap memory cell. The main motivation behind
the separation logic is to describe in a succinct way the state of the heap during
program execution.
A separation logic assertion is interpreted on a program state (s, h), where
s and h are a store and a heap, respectively. The store is a function mapping
program variables to values and the heap is a partial map from pairs of ob-
ject IDs and object fields to values. A value is either an object or a constant.
To capture the heap related aspects, separation logic extends the syntax and
semantics of the assertional part of Hoare logic. Separation logic adds heap op-
erators (expressions) to the usual first order assertions of Hoare logic. The basic
heap expressions are emp, i.e., the empty heap, satisfied by states having a heap
with no entries, and E 7→ F (read as E points to F ), i.e., a singleton heap,
satisfied by a state with a heap consisting of only one entry at address E with
content F . For instance, o.x 7→ v means that field x of object o has value v. Two
heap expressions H1 and H2 corresponding to heaps h1 and h2, respectively, can
be combined using the separating conjunction operator ∗, provided h1 and h2
have disjoint address domains. Expression H1 ∗H2 corresponds to the (disjoint)
union h1 unionmulti h2 of the heaps. Note that H1 and H2 describe two separate parts of
the heap, h1 and h2, respectively. In contrast, the standard conjunction p1 ∧ p2,
where p1 and p2 are separation logic formulae, corresponds to the whole heap
satisfying both p1 and p2. Because of the domain disjointness requirement, the
separation logic formula (o.f 7→ 10) ∗ (o.f 7→ 10) evaluates to false, whereas
(o.f 7→ 10 ∧ o.f 7→ 10) is equivalent to (o.f 7→ 10).
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Like in Hoare logic, the triple {P}C{Q}, where C is a (segment of) a program
and P and Q are assertions describing its pre- and post-condition, respectively,
only concerns partial correctness; termination of C needs to be proven separately.
Separation logic adds to the standard rules (axioms) of the Hoare framework
axioms for each of the new statements - allocation, deallocation, and assignments
involving the heap cells. An important characteristic of separation logic is tight
interpretation.
In some cases it is needed to embed a precise specification of a program
segment C into a more general context. A specific axiom that allows this by en-
larging the specification of a program segment C with an assertion R describing
a disjoint heap segment which is not modified by any statement in C, is the
frame rule: 1
{P} C {Q}
{P ∗R} C {Q ∗R}
In a concurrent setting, the programming language is extended with a fork
statement, allowing to run program components in separate threads. For syn-
chronized access to global objects, semaphores are added, together with the
corresponding methods acquire and release.
The Owicki-Gries method extends the Hoare approach to concurrent pro-
grams preserving modularity. The first idea is to capture component behavior
with non-shared ghost variables enabling separate proofs of concurrent compo-
nents (for more on ghost variables, see Section 4). The second idea is to link
shared resource and ghost variable values through an invariant that holds out-
side critical regions [21]. A resource A is a set of heap locations, and IA is its
associated invariant. The crucial idea is that each component may update or ac-
cess these locations only within critical regions [11,14] in which the component
has exclusive access to the locations. Although IA may be violated within the
critical region, it is guaranteed to hold at the beginning and at the end of the
critical region. This is reflected in the rules for acquire and release:
{emp} s.acquire() {IA(s)}
{IA(s)} s.release() {emp}
The above described approach allows compositional verification. Each method
m belonging to a class C is verified as a sequential program considering the in-
variants as extra constraints. Class C is considered verified when all its methods
are verified. Since the program can be seen as a combination of classes and
declarations, the whole program is verified when all its classes are verified.
One of the central concepts in concurrent separation logic is ownership. Due
to tight interpretation, separation logic assertions can describe precisely the heap
footprint of a given program C, i.e., the parts of the heap which C is allowed
to use. Let l be a program component location and E a heap address. The com-
ponent owns address E at location l iff E is contained in a heap corresponding
1 Here we disregard the usual side condition of the frame rule, since we assume a
Java-like programming language not supporting global variables.
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to an assertion H which is true at location l. If E 7→ F is part of the heap
corresponding to H, then this can be seen as an informal permission [5] for the
verified component to read, write or dispose of the contents of the heap cell at
address E.
Partial permissions are introduced to allow shared ownership of variables.
Ownership is split into a number of fractional permissions, each of which only
allows read only access. Expression E 7−→ F denotes permission 1, i.e., exclusive
ownership, whereas a fractional permission is expressed as [z]E 7−→ F with 0 <
z < 1. Expression [1]E 7−→ F is equivalent to E 7−→ F . Permissions can be split and
merged during a proof. For instance, two fractional permissions can be merged
according to the following rule: [z]E 7−→ F ∗ [z′]E 7−→ F , where z+ z′ ≤ 1, implies
[z + z′]E 7−→ F . One acquires full ownership (and therefore write access) in case
z + z′ = 1. The split rule is analogous.
We use fractional permissions to enforce the syntactic rules and side condi-
tions of Owicki-Gries on the use of the (global) real and ghost variables. For
instance, by acquiring a semaphore, a component acquires the semaphore in-
variant. The semaphore invariant provides full permission to change the real
variables and the ghost variables associated with the component. A component
always holds a fraction of the permission for its ghost variables, thereby ruling
out that other components change them. When releasing the semaphore, the
component also releases the acquired (partial) ownerships.
4 Modular Specification Schema
Our aim is to specify modelling constructs and verify the implementation of
those constructs in a modular way, meaning that each construct and its imple-
mentation should be independently specifiable and verifiable. The benefits of a
modular approach are 1) that it will scale better than a monolithic approach
and 2) that once a construct has been specified, we can abstract away its imple-
mentation details when verifying properties of the system.
It is crucial that implementations of constructs do not need to be verified
again when their context changes. Because of this, and the fine-grained nature
of the generic code, standard methods like Owicki-Gries do not suffice. In [16], a
modular specification schema was proposed to solve this problem. In this section,
we introduce an improved version of this modular approach which, compared
to [16], provides a better abstraction from the implementation of the verified
method.
As already mentioned, the Java methods in our transformation framework
implement fine-grained parallelism. This means that each method may acquire
and release access to multiple critical regions (CR) during its execution, instead
of following a coarse-grained approach in which the complete method is executed
in one big CR. As CRs tend to form performance bottlenecks in software, a fine-
grained approach tends to decrease the level of dependency between threads in
a multi-threaded system, and thereby increase the overall performance.
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In order to verify methods with fine-grained parallelism, so-called ghost code
must be inserted as part of the annotations. To see how this mechanism of code
insertion works, we consider a method m belonging to a class C instantiated in
an object o. We want to give a specification of m in the form of a standard Hoare
logic triple {P}o.m{Q}. Under fine-grained parallelism one cannot formulate P
and Q in terms of the actual fields determining the state of o. For instance,
consider method send(msg, G) that sends a message msg to a channel queue q (q
is a field of C), as in Listing 1. At line 8, the piece of code G given as a parameter
to send is inserted.
Listing 1. A fine-grained send operation
1 class C
2 queue q
3 semaphore s
4 method send ( msg , G )
5 begin
6 s . acquire ( )
7 q := q + msg
8 G
9 s . release ( )
10 end
In a concurrent setting, multiple threads may send messages to the queue of
a single instance of C. In that case, q may be changed by some other send call
between the call to send(b) leaving the CR protecting q (line 9) and send(b)
returning the control to the calling client program (line 10). We cannot claim
that once send(a) is finished, the new content of q is q+a, where + indicates
concatenation. This is analogous to Owicki-Gries, where global variables altered
by multiple modules cannot be used directly to specify a module.2
To resolve this, ghost variables (also called logical or auxiliary variables) are
added to the program. Ghost variables are write-only, i.e., the instrumented
program can change them, but not read them. Hence, they do not change the
control flow of the program and are only auxiliary verification devices. Each ghost
variable is owned by a particular process, and only this process can potentially
change its content. To illustrate the use of ghost variables, let us assume that
send is used by a client program as shown in Listing 2.
Listing 2. A client using the send method.
1 o := New C ( )
2 o . send ( a ) | | o . send ( b )
Suppose we want to prove that if in the beginning of the program len(q) = 0
holds, where len gives the length of the queue, then at the end, len(q) = 2.
We specify the two instances of send by introducing ghost variables y and z
to capture the local effect on the length of q in the left and right method call,
respectively. Resource invariant IA ≡ len(q) = y + z captures how these local
effects relate to the global resource. Now we can specify send(a) with {y =
2 In the classical Owicki-Gries framework this is directly forbidden by the interplay of
the syntactic rules of the usage of the global variable and the side conditions of the
axioms for CR and parallel composition.
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0}send(a){y = 1} and send(b) with {z = 0}send(b){z = 1}. Finally, we define
G ≡ y := 1 for send(a) and G ≡ z := 1 for send(b), to update y and z,
respectively, at line 8 in Listing 1 when send is executed.
With verification axioms similar to Owicki-Gries, it can be proved that these
assertions indeed confirm the correctness of the client property. In particular,
the conjunction of the postconditions of send(a) and send(b), and IA, i.e., y =
1 ∧ z = 1 ∧ len(q) = y + z, implies the desired client postcondition len(q) = 2.
Passing corresponding ghost codes G to instances of m allows for abstrac-
tion and parallelism, but it does not make the approach modular. Each context
and/or property likely requires different ghost variables, and hence different P ,
Q, IA, and G. Suppose that we want to verify a property about the content of
q using a function cnt mapping the queue content to a set of messages. Specif-
ically, we want to prove that if in the beginning, cnt(q) = ∅, then at the end,
cnt(q) = {a, b}. In this case, our ghost variables range over sets of messages, and
the specifications must be adjusted accordingly, i.e., {y = ∅}send(a){y = {a}},
{z = ∅}send(b){z = {b}}, IA ≡ cnt(q) = y ∪ z, and G ≡ y := {a} and
G ≡ z := {b} for send(a) and send(b), respectively. Even if we had a library of
predicate sets and ghost code blocks, in general we would not be able to cover
all possible contexts in which the generic code, i.e., m, could be used.
Greater generality can be achieved by a schema along the lines of [16] in
which P , Q, IA, and G are parameters of the specification of m. The schema
imposes some constraints on these parameters which become proof obligations
when verifying code involving m. Under these constraints, m needs to be ver-
ified only once. For each new context, the client only needs to verify that the
contraints hold. We propose a new modular specification schema (MSS) that
allows further abstraction from the implementation details of m, by supporting
parameterization based on CRs. Unlike in [16], the semaphores that implement
the CR as well as the names of the fields that determine the state of the object
(s and q, resp., in the send example) remain absent from the specification. As a
result one retains the flexibility of the OO approach. For example, if the imple-
mentation of the CR is changed such that locks are used instead of semaphores,
the specification can remain the same.
We proceed by giving the intuition behind the MSS. We first establish the
relationships between the parameters P , Q, IA, and G, that need to hold in
order for the specification to be correct. Later we lift these relationships to the
level of the whole method m to formulate the MSS.
Listing 3. A semaphore based implementation of a CR
1 {P}
2 s . acquire ( )
3 {IA ( s ) * P}
4 {O ( v ) * I ( v ) * P}
5 C
6 {O ( post ( v ) ) * I ( v ) * P}
7 G
8 {O ( post ( v ) ) * I ( post ( v ) ) * Q}
9 {IA ( s ) * Q}
10 s . release ( )
11 {Q}
9
Assume that the body ofm consists of only a single CR implemented by using
semaphore s. The CR is of the form s.acquire() C s.release() as given in
Listing 3. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the CR protects a single
field f of an instance o of class C. Field f can be changed only within the CR.
When establishing the relationships, we are guided by the correctness re-
quirements for the annotation of Listing 3 in the familiar Hoare logic/Owicki-
Gries style. The validity of P and Q at lines 1 and 11, respectively, implies that
IA(s)∗P and IA(s)∗Q hold at lines 3 and 9, respectively (we write IA(s) instead
of just IA to emphasize that it is associated with s). This follows from the rules
from Section 3 (for acquire and release combined with the frame rule), and
the fact that P and Q do not refer to s and hence involve parts of the heap
disjoint from the parts affected by acquire and release. This is analogous to
the proof rule for the CR in Owicki-Gries.
To capture the environment constraints, next to ghost variables, IA(s) may
also depend on o.f. To avoid directly referring to f and thereby making the
approach modular, we introduce a so-called payload invariant I, parameterized
with a ghost variable v. In the example of Listing 2, IA(s) ≡ len(q) = y + z
would be substituted by I(v) ≡ len(v) = y + z. To link the actual field f with
its ghost counterpart v we use predicate O(v) (for the earlier send example, we
could define O(v) ≡ q = v). O(v) is an abstract predicate local to o that is not
visible for the client. By defining IA(s) = ∃v.O(v)∗I(v), we circumvent the need
to refer to o.f in the client invariant.
Line 4 in Listing 3 is obtained by substituting O(v) ∗ I(v) for IA(s) at line
3. Since C affects only actual variables, P holds also in the postcondition of C
at line 6. However, since the actual variables have changed while ghost variable
v remains the same, predicate O holds only for an adjusted value of v given by
post(v). In our example, post(v) ≡ len(v) + 1. G only affects y and z, so after
G, O(post(v)) remains valid. So, in order to recover the invariant IA, G at line
7 should be chosen such that it modifies the ghost variables occurring in I(v)
and P in such a way that I(post(v)) becomes true and P is transformed to Q
(line 8). Proving that G indeed has this property remains a proof obligation for
the client program calling m and as such becomes a premise of our schema. It
is easy to check that this constraint is satisfied by all instances of send in the
running example for both client properties. Finally, line 9 follows directly from
line 8 by the definition of IA(s).
The Modular Specification Schema By summarizing the constraints on the
various elements of the annotation, and lifting them to the level of method m,
we obtain the MSS:
∀v • {P ∗ I(v)} G {Q(res(v)) ∗ I(post(v))}
{∃v •O(v) ∗ [pi]o.A(I(v)) ∗ P} r := o.m(G) {∃v •O(v) ∗ [pi]o.A(I(v)) ∗Q(r)}
For simplicity, we assume that m has no parameters besides G. However,
additional parameters can be captured in the usual way for procedure verification
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rules in Hoare logic. We also assume that m returns a result res(v) immediately
after leaving the CR, that is assigned to variable r. In general, Q depends on r.
Both res(v) and post(v) are fixed by the supplier of m.
Predicate A links semaphore s with the payload invariant I. Both A and
O are abstract predicates in the sense that the client does not need to know
their definition since they are local to o. For the send example, A would state
that there is a semaphore s that is properly initialized and it associates to A
a semaphore invariant IA(s) (formed using I(v) as described earlier). These
implementation details, including s, are hence not visible to the client calling m.
Finally, pi is an arbitrary fraction denoting a fractional permission for A.
Note that MSS is not an axiom or a proof rule of separation logic, since for any
correct module it can be derived from other axioms and rules. The correctness
of MSS can be verified using the annotation in Listing 3.
MSS can be seen as a means to divide the proof obligations between the
client and the supplier of m. The schema is implicitly universally quantified over
P , Q, I, and G. Note that post and res are fixed by the supplier and that they
implicitly define the effect of C on o.f in a sequential environment. On the
other hand, the client is free to use any predicates P , Q, I, and G satisfying
the premise of MSS. For any such predicates, the supplier guarantees that the
implementation of m satisfies the triple in the consequent of MSS.
The premise of MSS ∀v.{P ∗ I(v)} G {Q(res(v))∗ I(post(v))} is analogous to
the premise of the Owicki-Gries CR axiom {P ∗ IA(s)} C {Q(r) ∗ IA(s)}. MSS,
however, shifts the verification from the actual code C and invariant IA to the
ghost code G and the payload invariant I. Although C does not appear in MSS,
its specification is reflected in v, post(v) and res(v). Although G has to reflect
all important aspects of each call of o.m, the method is still to a great extent
modular since the implementation and verification of the program text of o.m
remains completely independent of the call of o.m which is invoked.
The soundness of the modular schema follows from the same arguments pre-
sented in [16].
5 Specifying and Verifying the SLCO Channel
In this section we present the specification and verification of an essential part
of the generic code for our SLCO-to-Java transformation, namely the commu-
nication channel. We specify the channel for use in a generic, multi-threaded
environment. Using VeriFast, we verify the absence of race conditions and dead-
locks, and show how to prove properties of clients using the channel.
SLCO models use asynchronous non-blocking lossless channels that can hold
a predefined maximum number of messages. The channel datastructure provides
two operations, send and receive, to add and remove messages. It has a FIFO
structure, i.e., messages are added to the end and removed from the front of
a queue. Provided that the client program invoking a channel operation has
exclusive access to the channel, the specification of the operations is as follows.
The send operation has one parameter msg, the message that is being sent. If
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the contents of the channel is q and it is not full when send is started, then
after execution of send the contents of the channel is q + msg, where + denotes
concatenation of sequences of messages. Furthermore, send returns a Boolean
result indicating whether or not the operation was successful; if the channel
is already full when send is started, false is returned. Whenever receive is
started and the channel has contents msg + q, then the channel's new contents
after execution of receive, provided that any provided conditions hold, is q,
and message msg is returned as a result. If the channel is empty when receive
starts executing, then receive is blocked until it succeeds to remove a message.
Since the channel is used in a multi-threaded environment, adding and removing
messages should be done atomically.
We illustrate our modular approach described in Section 4 on the send
method of the channel implementation. In VeriFast, each Java source code file
being verified is linked to a specification file only containing (abstract) pred-
icates and specifications of Java methods and ghost functions. The VeriFast
specification of the method following MSS is given in Listing 4. (The complete
specification and annotated implementation files will become part of the Java
examples set in the standard distribution of VeriFast.)
Listing 4. Part of the channel specification
1 public f ina l c lass Channel {
2 // . . .
3
4 boolean send ( String msg )
5 /*@
6 r e qu i r e s
7 [ ? p i ]A(? I ) &*&
8 is_G_S(?G, th i s , I , msg , ?P, ?Q) &*& P() ;
9 @*/
10 /*@
11 ensures
12 [ p i ]A( I ) &*& Q( r e s u l t ) ;
13 @*/
14 // . . .
15 }
The VeriFast specific text, i.e., specifications and ghost variable declarations,
is inside special comments delimited by @. The pre- and postconditions that form
the contract are denoted by the keywords requires and ensures, respectively.
Component predicates of the pre- and postcondition are glued by the separating
conjunction operator denoted by &*&. Predicates A, I, P, and Q correspond to
their namesakes in the MSS, whereas the assertion is_G_S implements the pass-
ing of the ghost code G into the method. Both [?pi] and [pi] correspond to
the fractional permission [pi]. The question mark ? in front of a variable means
that the value of the variable is recorded and that all later occurrences of that
variable in the contract must be equal to the first occurrence. For instance, in
Listing 4, the value of the fractional permission pi in the precondition must be
the same as the one in the postcondition (as also required in the MSS).
Predicates P, Q and is_G_S are left undefined and are supposed to be provided
by the client. More precisely, a lemma function G is supplied by the client based
on which VeriFast automatically creates the predicate is_G_S. A VeriFast lemma
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function is a method without side effects which helps the verification engine. The
contract of a lemma function corresponds to a theorem, its body to the proof,
and a lemma function call to an application of the theorem. Listing 5 contains
the specification of G that corresponds to the ghost statement block G.
Note that the specification of G in Listing 5 corresponds to the premise of
MSS, where post(v) specifies that if res = true, msg has been added to the
channel, and otherwise it has not (line 4).
Listing 5. A lemma function specifying the ghost statement block G
1 /*@
2 typede f lemma void G(Channel c , p r ed i c a t e ( l i s t <Object >, i n t ) I ,
S t r ing msg , p r ed i c a t e ( ) P, p r ed i c a t e ( boolean ) Q) ( boolean r e s ) ;
3 r e qu i r e s P( ) &*& I (? items , ?qms) ;
4 ensures Q( r e s ) &*& I ( r e s ? append ( items , cons (msg , n i l ) ) :
items , qms) ;
5 @*/
Method send is part of the class Channel (Listing 6), implementing the
SLCO channel construct. Class Channel contains three fields: the list itemList
implementing the FIFO queue, semaphore s that is used to implement access to
the CR within the operations, and queueMaxSize defining the maximum channel
capacity. For verification purposes we add the ghost field inv which is used to
keep track of the invariant.
Semaphore invariant I_A, corresponding to IA in Section 4, is given at lines
34 in Listing 6. The invariant is defined by means of a predicate constructor
parameterized with the payload invariant I. Corresponding to the definition of
IA, in I_A, it is checked that for ghost variables items and qms, i.e., the contents
of the item list and the maximum number of messages, respectively, I holds. The
question mark ? is used to record the value of the variable following it, for use
later on in the predicate. Operator 7→ is written in VeriFast as |->, and the
expression of the form [f] denotes fractional ownership with fraction f. When
f = 1, the fractions are omitted, and an arbitrary fraction is denoted as [_].
Listing 6. A specification of the Channel class
1
2 /*@
3 pred icate_ctor I_A(Channel channel , p r ed i c a t e ( l i s t <Object >, i n t ) I )
( ) =
4 channel .O(? items , ?qms) &*& I ( items , qms) ;
5 @*/
6
7 public f ina l c lass Channel {
8 List itemList ;
9 Semaphore s ;
10 int queueMaxSize ;
11 //@ inv inv ;
12 //@ pred i c a t e O( l i s t <Object> items , i n t qms) = th i s . i t emLi s t |−>
? i temLi s t &*& itemLi s t . L i s t ( i tems ) &*& th i s . queueMaxSize
|−> qms &*& length ( items ) <= qms ;
13 //@ pred i c a t e A( p r ed i c a t e ( l i s t <Object >, i n t ) I ) = . . . &*& s |−>
?sem &*& [_] sem . Semaphore (I_A( th i s , I ) ) ;
14 }
In predicate O (line 12), as explained earlier, the links are established between
ghost variables and fields. Its first conjunct channel.itemList |-> ?itemList
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implies exclusive ownership of the field itemList and at the same time that
the value of itemList is recorded for later use in the contract. Expression
itemList.List(items) states the fact that itemList is a list with elements
items. The final conjunct links queueMaxSize to ghost variable qms.
We use the VeriFast ownership concept to implement syntactic restrictions
on the variables. In particular, we need to ensure that the fields like itemList
can be modified only in the CR implemented by semaphore s and that the ghost
variables are modified exclusively by at most one method, in this case send.
Predicate A is given at line 13 in Listing 6. Like its MSS counterpart A, it is
parameterized with the payload invariant I (corresponding to I in MSS). Besides
some auxiliary conjuncts, it has two conjuncts to associate I_A with s, the first
of which is parameterized with the payload invariant and the object itself.
Listing 7. The annotation of the Channel send method
1 public f ina l c lass Channel {
2 // . . .
3 public boolean send ( String msg )
4 /*@ requ i r e s . . . ensure s . . . @*/
5 {
6 //@ open [ p i ]A( I ) ;
7 //@ s . makeHandle ( ) ;
8 s . acquire ( ) ;
9 //@ open I_A( th i s , I ) ( ) ;
10
11 boolean result = itemList . size ( ) < queueMaxSize ;
12 i f ( result )
13 itemList . add ( msg ) ;
14
15 //@ G( r e s u l t ) ;
16 //@ length_append ( items , cons (msg , n i l ) ) ;
17 //@ c l o s e I_A( th i s , I ) ( ) ;
18 s . release ( ) ;
19 //@ c l o s e [ p i ]A( I ) ;
20 return result ;
21 }
22 // . . .
23 }
Listing 8. Client program specification
1 public c lass Program {
2 //@ s t a t i c i n t sendCount ;
3 //@ s t a t i c i n t rece iveCount ;
4 public stat ic int messageMaxCount ; // k
5
6 public stat ic void main ( String [ ] args )
7 //@ r e qu i r e s c la s s_in i t_token (Program . c l a s s ) &*&
Program_messageMaxCount (?mmc) &*& 0 < mmc;
8 //@ ensures Program_messageMaxCount (mmc) &*& [_]
Program_sendCount (? sc ) &*& [_] Program_receiveCount (? rc ) &*&
mmc == sc &*& mmc == rc ;
9 {
10 // . . .
11 }
12 }
Listing 7 contains the send method with its corresponding full annotation
that further facilitates verification. Since VeriFast does not automatically unfold
predicate definitions, ghost statement open is used to do this, i.e., to replace
14
the predicate with its definition. In this way the heap chunks of the defini-
tion are made visible to the verifier. The opposite effect is achieved by close
which replaces heap chunks with the corresponding predicate definition. At line
6 predicate A is unfolded to obtain the predicates needed for acquiring s. After
the acquisition of the semaphore also its invariant I_A is opened at line 9 to get
access to the heap chunks related to itemList and queueMaxSize.
The code segment at lines 11-13 corresponds to C in the MSS, and affects
the real variables. The code at lines 15-17 is ghost code. The lemma function
performing the updates of the ghost variables is called at line 15. Annotation of
the receive method can be done in an analogous way.
Class Channel annotated as in Listing 7 is verifiable against its specification
in VeriFast. This means that it is free of deadlocks and race conditions. Those
requirements are not explicitly specified, but are always checked when VeriFast
tries to verify code. The class is now ready to be used by client programs to verify
specific properties, using the pre- and postconditions and the payload invariant.
Listing 9. SenderThread class specification
1 class SenderThread implements Runnable {
2 //@ pred i c a t e pre ( ) = th i s . c |−> ?c &*& [_] c .A( I ) &*& [_]
Program_sendCount (0 ) &*& [_] Program_messageMaxCount (?mmc)
&*& 0 < mmc;
3 //@ pred i c a t e post ( ) = th i s . c |−> ?c &*& [_] c .A( I ) &*& [_]
Program_messageMaxCount (?mmc) &*& [_] Program_sendCount (? sc )
&*& mmc == sc ;
4
5 Channel c ;
6 . . .
7
8 public void run ( )
9 //@ r e qu i r e s pre ( ) ;
10 //@ ensures post ( ) ;
11 {
12 for ( i = 0 ; i < Program . messageMaxCount ; i++)
13 {
14 for ( ; ; ) {
15 /*@
16 pr ed i c a t e P( ) = [ 1 / 2 ] Program_sendCount ( i ) &*& [ 1 / 3 ]
Program_messageMaxCount (mmc) ;
17 pr ed i c a t e Q( boolean r ) = [ 1 / 2 ] Program_sendCount ( r ? i
+ 1 : i ) &*& [ 1 / 3 ] Program_messageMaxCount (mmc) ;
18 lemma void ghost_send ( boolean r )
19 r e qu i r e s . . . ensure s . . .
20 {
21 open P( ) ;
22 . . .
23 }
24 @*/
25 //@ produce_lemma_function_pointer_chunk ( ghost_send ) : G_S
( c , I , m, P, Q) ( r ) { c a l l ( ) ; } ;
26 //@ c l o s e P( ) ;
27 boolean success = this . c . send ( "message" ) ;
28 //@ open Q( suc c e s s ) ;
29 }
30 }
31 //@ c l o s e post ( ) ;
32 }
33 }
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Next, we discuss how the property `if k messages are sent over the channel,
k messages will be received' can be specified for a program using the channel
via one sending and one receiving thread. First, of all, Listing 8 specifies the
client program we use. In the main method (lines 6 and onwards), an instance
of the channel is created, and a sending and a receiving thread are started,
one sending k, i.e. messageMaxCount, messages, and the other one trying to
receive them. To specify the property, we introduce two new ghost variables
for counting the number of messages (lines 2 and 3). In the precondition of
main, we require that the class has been properly initialized (conjunct 1 at line
7), link the messageMaxCount variable to the ghost variable mmc, and have an
additional requirement that it is at least equal to 1. In the post-condition, we
link sendCount and receiveCount respectively to sc and rc, and require that
they are both equal to mmc (line 8).
To determine that the post-condition holds, we need to specify the thread
sending the messages. In Listing 9, at lines 2 and 3, its pre- and post-condition
are specified. In the run method, the messages are sent. For the send call at
line 27, we need to provide ghost code G_S. This is done in lemma ghost_send,
where the ghost variables are updated. This lemma is linked to the call at line
25. The pre- and post-condition of send are specified as two predicates, P and
Q, see lines 16 and 17.
VeriFast was able to verify the code against its specification, meaning that
the property holds. Besides the environment with two threads, we were also able
to consider an environment consisting of multiple senders and receivers, to verify
that no conflicts can arise in such a setting.
6 Related Work
Much work has been done and continues to be done on the verification of model
transformations. For an overview of the field, see [22]. Here, we mention some
relevant work that also focusses on 1) model-to-code transformations, 2) for-
mal verification of correctness using theorem provers, and 3) correctness as the
preservation of behavioural semantics. The latter seems to be the most relevant
interpretation of correctness mentioned in [22], as it addresses behavioural as-
pects, in our case, for example, race and deadlock freedom of communication
channels, both in SLCO and the Java implementation.
Amphion [2] is a tool to generate code from models of space geometry prob-
lems. It uses a theorem prover automatically, hiding the details from the user,
to create Fortran source code that is correct by construction. Besides address-
ing a different type of models, they do not separately consider the generic code
constructs used. We, on the other hand, have yet to prove correctness of our
entire transformation method. It would be interesting to see if their approach is
to some degree applicable for us.
In [24], the QVT language and transformations are formalised for use with
the KIV theorem prover, to verify Java code generators for security properties
and syntactic correctness. Their approach is operational, but scalability is still a
16
serious issue. We wonder whether a split similar to ours of the proof obligations
for generic and specific code would improve the scalability.
Other techniques address very similar issues, but work strictly indirectly, i.e.,
they focus on code generated from a concrete model as opposed to transforma-
tions that produce code. We mention some works here, since our work can to
some extent also be considered as indirect (one condition for directness given
in [22] is that the transformation rules are formalised, which we have not done
yet). Blech [4] verifies semantics preservation of a statechart-to-Java transforma-
tion using Isabelle/HOL. In [9,10], annotations are generated together with code
to assist automatic theorem proving. The latter is a very interesting approach
that we may consider for the analysis of our specific code.
An approach to generate Java code from Communicating Sequential Pro-
cesses (CSP) specifications is described in [27]. The authors describe how they
have verified that a CSP model of their implementation of a channel semanti-
cally corresponds with a simpler CSP model describing the desired functionality
of that channel. First of all, by working from a model describing the implemen-
tation, as opposed to the implementation itself, one still needs to prove that
the model corresponds exactly with the implementation to establish that the
implementation itself is correct. Second of all, it seems that a fully modular ver-
ification approach in the way we wish to have it is not completely possible; for
instance, although it would be possible to use their simpler CSP model of a chan-
nel within detailed implementation-level CSP models of systems using channels,
one could not abstract away the functionality of a channel to the same extent
as when using separation logic if one would like to prove a functional property
referring to communication, but not expressing how the communication itself
should proceed.
Regarding theorem proving, to the best of our knowledge the approach in [16]
was the first one supporting fully general modular specification and verification
of fine-grained concurrent modules and their clients. Compared to the schema
in [16], the MSS we propose imposes conditions on the ghost code instead of
the actual code, and abstracts away the implementation of the protected object
better than [16] does, thereby improving the modular nature of the approach.
An approach comparable to [16] appears in [26] where a new separation logic
is presented with concurrent abstract predicates. Furthermore, in [25] they have
applied their approach to prove correctness of some synchronisation primitives
of the Joins concurrent C# library. As far as we know, the authors do not intend
to eventually use their approach to verify model transformations. It remains to
be investigated whether theirs can be used for that as well.
Another viable option to verify model-to-code transformations seems to be
the use of software model checking techniques, in which a formalization of a
program is checked against an automaton capturing a specification [7,17]. How-
ever, it remains to be investigated whether one can verify implementations of
modelling constructs for general environments as we have done here.
The Java Modelling Language (JML) is a behavioural interface specification
language for Java. An advantage of JML over separation logic is that Java ex-
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pressions can be used. Several verification tools have been developed that use
JML as a specification language [6]. The extended static checker for Java (ES-
C/Java2) [8], for instance, was one of the first of such tools. However, it is not
designed to prove full functional correctness, but rather find common program-
ming errors, and hence it is not suitable for our task. Krakatoa [19] and the
Key tool [3], on the other hand, are program verifiers that may be used by
us as alternatives to VeriFast. To which extent this is possible remains to be
investigated.
Adding ownership types [12,33] to Java is a very effective technique to verify
that Java threads always access data correctly, i.e. for which they have acquired
the proper access rights. Such a technique offers an alternative way to verify that
our channel implementation is always correctly accessed. However, it cannot be
used to verify arbitrary functional properties that may rely on ownership, but
express more than that, such as that some desired behaviour is guaranteed to
always eventually happen. On the other hand, with separation logic, one can
express and verify such properties as well.
7 Conclusions
We introduced an MDSE approach where generated code is separated into a
generic and a model specific part. We presented an application of a modular
approach for the verification of fine grained concurrent code in this context
using the VeriFast tool. This paper showed the ideas behind and the feasibility
of such an approach. With its support of parameterized verification, concurrency
via threads, object-oriented code, and fast verification results,VeriFast was up to
the task - though an experienced user is required. This underlines the relevance
of the idea of re-using generic code that has to be verified only once.
We introduced a novel module specification schema which improves the mod-
ularity of the VeriFast approach. Although the schema was originally developed
having in mind separation logic and VeriFast, it can be straightforwardly adapted
for the standard Owicki-Gries method (assuming extensions with modules) or
similar formalisms for concurrent verification.
Finally, using theorem provers to verify the correctness of code still requires
considerable expert knowledge. We observe that by using model-to-code trans-
formations, experts can focus on proving correctness of those transformations,
thereby relieving developers from the burden to prove that code derived from
specific models is correct.
In future work, we plan to address liveness issues, both in the framework and
as regards verification, and we plan to address verification of the complete model-
to-code transformation, i.e., not only that the used generic code constructs are
correct, but that it is guaranteed that the complete executable code is always
correct. This is quite challenging, since SLCO also supports the timing of ac-
tions. SLCO models with timing can be formally verified by first discretising the
timing [31]. Other relevant challenges and ideas are reported in [32].
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